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DEMEANOR
Olin Guy Wellborn 111t
I
INTRODUCTION
A premise of several legal rules and institutions is that the op-
portunity of a trier of fact (a jury, judge, or hearing officer) to view
the demeanor of a witness is of great value to the trier in deciding
whether to believe the witness's testimony. Stated differently, the
premise is that ordinary people untrained in detecting deception
generally will make significantly more accurate judgments of credi-
bility if they have the opportunity to view the demeanor of a witness
than if they do not.
Psychologists and other students of human communication
have investigated many aspects of deceptive behavior and its detec-
tion. As part of this investigation, they have attempted to determine
experimentally whether ordinary people can effectively use nonver-
bal indicia to determine whether another person is lying. In effect,
social scientists have tested the legal premise concerning demeanor
as a scientific hypothesis. With impressive consistency, the experi-
mental results indicate that this legal premise is erroneous. Accord-
ing to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective
use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On
the contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of de-
meanor diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility
judgments.
The credibility of a witness's testimony depends upon more
than the witness's honesty. A sincere witness may innocently convey
inaccurate information as a result of an error of perception or mem-
ory. Therefore, a trier's overall evaluation of a particular witness
may include appraising the validity of the witness's beliefs as well as
deciding whether the witness intends to tell the truth. Do the ap-
pearance and nonverbal behavior of a witness help the trier to judge
the accuracy of the witness's beliefs? On this issue as well, substan-
tial experimental evidence suggests that they do not.
Although mounting experimental evidence against the utility of
demeanor contradicts orthodox legal assumptions, the proposition
t William C. Liedtke, Sr. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Af-
fairs, The University of Texas School of Law. A.B. 1970,J.D. 1973, Harvard University.
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that demeanor is as likely to mislead as to enlighten is not counter-
intuitive, and will be readily endorsed by many lawyers. To the ex-
tent that the legal community may be persuaded that the availability
of demeanor evidence does not enhance judgments of credibility, it
is appropriate to reexamine several legal doctrines and practices.
The purpose of this Article is to summarize the pertinent social sci-
ence materials and to suggest appropriate legal responses. Part II
briefly outlines the orthodox legal position on demeanor. Part III
summarizes the psychological and human communication research
that bears upon the usefulness of demeanor. Part IV then explores
the specific implications of these experimental investigations for
several legal rules and practices.
II
DEMEANOR IN THE LAW
All of us know that, in every-day life, the way a man behaves when
he tells a story-his intonations, his fidgetings or composure, his
yawns, the use of his eyes, his air of candor or of evasiveness-
may furnish valuable clues to his reliability. Such clues are by no
means impeccable guides, but they are often immensely helpful.
So the courts have concluded.1
Wigmore wrote that a witness's demeanor, "without any defi-
nite rules as to its significance, is always assumed to be in evi-
dence." 2 Michael and Adler cited demeanor evidence as the sole
1 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 21 (1950); see NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201
F.2d 484, 487-90 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.) (recounting the history of "demeanor evi-
dence" from Roman times); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d
Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.) ("[O]n the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness
will usually be the dominating factors, when the words alone leave any rational
choice."); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80
(2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.). The Second Circuit in Broadcast Music noted:
The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet
it may be "contradicted" in the trial court by his manner, his intonations,
his grimaces, his gestures, and the like-all matters which "cold print
does not preserve" and which constitute "lost evidence" so far as an up-
per court is concerned.... The witness' demeanor, not apparent in the
record, may alone have "impeached" him.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible
Imperatives, 47 A.B.A. J. 580 (1961) (quoting several judges and lawyers extolling the
value of demeanor). There have been strikingly few skeptics. An important, rare exam-
ple is Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MINN. L. REV. 903, 932-40 (1971).
2 3AJOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 946 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)
[hereinafterJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]; see 5 id. § 1395 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974);JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OFJUDICIAL PROOF §§ 268-271 (3d ed. 1937). Wigmore's
statement that there are no rules as to the significance of demeanor may mislead. There
are doctrines about the trier's discretion regarding credibility which, at least insofar as
they limit discretion, concern the significance of demeanor. For example, all courts hold
that a trier may not find a fact solely on the basis of disbelief of testimony denying the
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exception to the general rule that for a matter to be evidence, it
must be formally offered by a party and admitted by thejudge.3 The
California Evidence Code puts "demeanor while testifying" first on
a long list of matters that have a "tendency in reason to prove or
disprove the truthfulness of" testimony.4
The importance of demeanor as an indicator of credibility is
commonly cited as a premise of the general requirement of live tes-
timony, the hearsay rule, and the right of confrontation.5 The im-
portance placed upon demeanor information is highlighted by the
strict limits traditionally placed upon trial use of depositions and
transcribed testimony taken in other proceedings. 6 The opportu-
nity of the trier to observe the demeanor of witnesses is a principal
basis for the deference accorded by reviewing courts to factual de-
terminations of trial courts and hearing officers. 7 The assumption
that demeanor provides highly useful information plays an impor-
tant role in other procedural doctrines.8
fact, and most courts hold that a trier may not discredit the uncontradicted,
unimpeached testimony of a disinterested witness. See infra subparts IV(E) & (F).
3 See Jerome Michael & MortimerJ. Adler, Real Proof. 1, 5 VAND. L. REV. 344, 365-
66, 366 n.65 (1952). But see RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEVEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 990 n.5 (2d ed. 1982) ("judicial notice" of common experience
by ajury may be another exception to the general requirement that evidence be formally
offered and admitted).
4 CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (Deering 1966).
5 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). As the Mattox
Court explained:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question [the con-
frontation clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such
as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by
his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note (hearsay rule)
("The demeanor of the witness traditionally has been believed to furnish trier and oppo-
nent with valuable clues."); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 (3d ed. 1984)
(hearsay rule); id § 252, at 751 (confrontation); 5JAMES W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
43.03 (2d ed. 1990) (requirement of live testimony); 3AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra
note 2, § 946 ("So important has this form of evidence [demeanor] been deemed in our
system of procedure that by a fixed rule of confrontation the witness is required to be
present before the tribunal while delivering his testimony.") (citation omitted); 5 id
§ 1395 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) (confrontation); infra subpart IV(A).
6 See generally FED. R. Cwv. P. 32(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1);
UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, ch. 25; infra subpart IV(C).
7 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,495-96 (1951); FED. R.
CiV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses."); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 13.8 (3d ed. 1985); infra subpart IV(B).
8 See infra Part IV.
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III
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE UTILITY OF NONVERBAL
BEHAVIOR IN DETECTION OF DECEPTION OR
INACCURACY
The appearance and nonverbal behavior of a witness might
bear upon the witness's credibility in two ways: first, as an indicator
of sincerity-the willingness of the witness to tell the truth-and,
second, as evidence of the quality of the witness's perceptions and
memory-his or her capacity to know the truth.9 Social scientists
have investigated both issues. The studies described in subpart A of
this Part address the question whether nonverbal behavior provides
usable indicia of deception. Other studies, summarized in subpart
B, consider whether appearance and demeanor provide reliable data
to subjects who must decide whether to trust the accuracy of an-
other person's perceptions and memory.
A. Demeanor and Detection of Deception
A central issue in the psychology of deception and deception
detection is whether ordinary, untrained observers can discern
whether another person is lying, and if so, how. Do liars emit non-
verbal signals of dishonesty, which others can reliably perceive and
interpret? Many social scientists have investigated these questions.
There are three main categories of nonverbal "channels" or
"cues": face, body, and voice (sometimes called "paralinguistic"
cues) °1O Together, these categories comprise what lawyers call de-
meanor."1 A number of experiments have attempted to assess the
utility of various cues or channels in situations reproducing many of
the features of courtroom testimony. In these experiments, as in
trials, the "witnesses" ("respondents") are strangers to the "triers"
("subjects"). In the best studies, the respondents tell actual truths
and falsehoods (as opposed to playing the role of a liar or truth-
teller) and have a genuine motive to deceive.
The psychology of deception and deception detection in the
courtroom is particularly amenable to experimental analysis. Psy-
9 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 932. Courts and lawyers have emphasized the rela-
tion of demeanor to sincerity, giving little attention to the relation of demeanor to ca-
pacity. See, e.g., Sahm, supra note 1 (quoting several judges and lawyers on the value of
demeanor).
10 See, e.g., John E. Hocking, Joyce Bauchner, Edmund P. Kaminski & Gerald R.
Miller, Detecting Deceptive Communication from Verbal, Visual, and Paralinguistic Cues, 6 HUM.
COMM. RES. 33, 34 (1979) [hereinafter Detecting Deceptive Communication]; Glenn E. Lit-
tlepage & Martin A. Pineault, Verbal, Facial, and Paralinguistic Cues to the Detection of Truth
and Lying, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 461 (1978).
11 In many courtrooms the architecture of the witness and jury boxes limits the
amount of body cues available to jurors.
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chologists appropriately worry about whether laboratory conditions
sufficiently relate to "real life," meaning the unstructured, relatively
spontaneous interactions of daily life in which deception commonly
occurs.' 2 Courtrooms have more in common with laboratories than
with "real life." Courtroom testimony, like respondent interviews
in the experiments, is nonspontaneous, highly structured, self-
conscious, and public. The respondents and subjects in the experi-
ments are strangers who are assigned task-oriented roles analogous
to the roles of witnesses and fact-finders in a trial.
Of course, there are important differences between the condi-
tions of the typical psychological experiment and the conditions of a
trial. In assessing the implications of the experiments, one must
consider how the differences bear on the efficacy of nonverbal cues
to deception. Four differences stand out: context, cross-examina-
tion, deliberation, and preparation. First, in a trial, each witness's
testimony has a much more substantial context-the other evidence
in the case-than the respondents' stories in the experiments. Sec-
ond, none of the experiments elicits statements from respondents
using the legal format of direct and cross-examination by adversary
representatives. Third, jurors deliberate and make decisions by
consensus rather than individually; by contrast, the experimental
subjects decide alone whether to believe a respondent's statement.
Finally, many trial witnesses prepare or rehearse extensively before
testifying. The preparation often includes some "coaching" about
demeanor by the attorney who presents the witness, reflecting the
attorney's notions of what jurors perceive to be honest or dishonest
nonverbal behavior. Experimental respondents normally make
their true or false statements without rehearsal or coaching.' 3
The relationships of context, cross-examination, deliberation,
and preparation to nonverbal cues to deception merit further
study.' 4 In the meantime, the existing psychological literature indi-
cates that nonverbal cues do not enhance the accuracy of credibility
determinations under trial conditions. The four named trial condi-
tions probably decrease, rather than increase, the utility of nonver-
bal deception cues.' 5
12 See, e.g., Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo & Robert Rosenthal, Verbal and Non-
verbal Communication of Deception, 14 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 39-40
(1981).
13 Some experiments specifically address the effects of rehearsal. See, e.g., Gerald R.
Miller, Mark A. deTurck & Pamela J. Kalbfieisch, Self-Monitoring, Rehearsal, and Deceptive
Communication, 10 HUM. COMM. RES. 97, 98-99, 114 (1983)(reporting unpublished stud-
ies of others as well as the authors' work).
14 Cf Joshua A. Fishman, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13
J. SOC. ISSUES 60, 64-65 (1957).
15 One early study that recreated nearly all the conditions of trial indicated that
demeanor had negative effects on subjects' ability to determine sincerity. An experi-
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Addressing each condition in turn, first, one must consider
whether the trial context of a witness's testimony somehow makes
the nonverbal information more usable than it would be without the
context. This is an unlikely hypothesis. It is more likely that the
presentation of successive witnesses in adversary format only makes
it more difficult for the trier to process any nonverbal information.16
One may agree with Wigmore's famous characterization of
cross-examination as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth," 17 and yet doubt that cross-
examination enhances demeanor as a barometer of sincerity. Mc-
Cormick, for example, wondered "whether it is not the honest but
weak or timid witness, rather than the rogue, who most often goes
down under the fire of a cross-examination."' 8 There is psychologi-
cal evidence to support McCormick's hypothesis. When respon-
dents are questioned by suspicious interviewers, subjects tend to
view their responses as deceptive even when they are honest, which
significantly increases detection errors. Two distinct phenomena
contribute to these errors: first, the suspicious interrogation dis-
torts observers' perceptions; second, the interrogation causes stress
for the respondent, which in turn induces behavior likely to be inter-
preted as deceptive. 19 The latter phenomenon has been called the
"Othello error,"20 since it is excellently illustrated by Othello's mis-
taken interpretation of Desdemona's distress and despair in re-
sponse to his accusation of infidelity. 21
mental case was tried to two juries upon live testimony of 12 witnesses, and to two other
juries upon transcribed testimony. The juries who received live testimony produced
significantly less accurate and complete findings than the juries who received transcripts.
William M. Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 5, 22-26 (1924).
A major reason for the relatively poor performance of the two juries who heard testi-
mony was that both believed dishonest testimony of a witness who related "the most
absurd and improbable details" with "extreme self-confidence." Id. at 24. On the effect
of witness confidence on jury acceptance of testimony, see infra text accompanying notes
70-81.
16 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 936. According to Cooper:
The problem [ofjurors using demeanor in deciding credibility] is further
accentuated, however, by the overall pattern of the trial. First one part of
the story is told, then another; one side tries its version, then the other
tries its own. Small wonder that many students of the problems of credi-
bility conclude helplessly that our modes of adversary procedure make
the jury's task nearly impossible.
Id.
17 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
18 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 31.
19 See PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES 162-89 (1985); Charles F. Bond Jr. & William E.
Fahey, False Suspicion and the Misperception of Deceit, 26 BRrr. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 41
(1987); Carol Toris & Bella M. DePaulo, Effects of Actual Deception and Suspiciousness of
Deception on Interpersonal Perceptions, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1063 (1984).
20 P. EKMAN, supra note 19, at 170; Bond & Fahey, supra note 19, at 41.
21 See William Shakespeare, Othello, V.ii.
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If the average individual observer cannot effectively interpret
nonverbal indicia to detect falsehood, it is unlikely that a delibera-
tive group of observers can do better. Even if some individuals pos-
sess superior lie detection skills, it is hard to imagine how such
individuals could impart their insights or persuade others to defer
to theirjudgments. Indeed, those who maintain that usable nonver-
bal indicia of insincerity exist usually also insist that such clues are
not susceptible to useful verbal description. 22 Even if a superior
credibility judgment could be articulated, how or why would it dis-
place an inferior judgment in a deliberative process? Although
most people cannot do better than chance in detecting falsehoods,
most people confidently believe they can do so.2_
Psychological research on the relationship between respondent
rehearsal and deception detection is inconclusive.24 Whether
"coaching" regarding demeanor 25 affects deception detection is un-
known. 26 Not all witnesses are truthful, and all coaching is calcu-
lated to reduce the chances that the witness will be discredited. A
good deal of coaching may be ineffectual, and some coaching of dis-
honest witnesses may actually backfire. Still, the overall effect of
coaching is not likely to facilitate the trier's task of detecting false
testimony. In addition to the obvious distortion when coaching
"succeeds" in imposing a consciously shaped demeanor, the pro-
cess of coaching demeanor may have more serious cognitive effects.
More specifically, coaching may change the witness's beliefs about
the facts. As Professor Applegate points out, even benign advice
about demeanor by an ethical attorney can occasionally contribute
to cognitive distortion:
General advice is useful in ensuring a relaxed witness who
will testify clearly and who will not be sidetracked or flustered by a
cross-examiner. Such general advice is also relatively innocuous
in terms of distorting testimony, because it is nonsubstantive. In
some situations, however, calming and relaxing a witness tends to
induce an unwarranted degree of certainty in the witness's testi-
22 See, e.g., Sahm, supra note 1, at 582.
23 See P. EKMAN, supra note 19, at 162; Detecting Deceptive Communication, supra note
10, at 42; Glenn E. Littlepage & Martin A. Pineault, Detection of Deceptive Factual Statements
from the Body and the Face, 5 PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 325, 328 (1979).
24 See Miller, deTurck & Kalbfleisch, supra note 13, at 98-99, 114.
25 See generally John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REv. 277, 288-89,
298-300 (1989).
26 See Fishman, supra note 14, at 64-65 ("legal lore... on the proper preparation or
coaching of witnesses via carefully staged rehearsals ... is itself fitting research material
for those interested in the psychology of testimony in particular and in forensic psychol-
ogy in general").
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mony. Such preparation may unwittingly turn a skeptical witness
into a true believer.2 7
In sum, none of the four conditions of trial testimony-context,
cross-examination, deliberation, and preparation or coaching-that
are absent from the typical experiment holds any promise of en-
hancing the utility of demeanor cues to credibility. Therefore, to
the extent that the experiments show that ordinary people cannot
make effective use of demeanor in detecting deception, they proba-
bly depict a similar inability on the part ofjurors, judges, and hear-
ing officers in trials.
Maier and Thurber's 1968 study,28 for example, indicated that
nonverbal information actually diminishes the accuracy of deception
detection. Researchers asked subjects to make judgments about the
honesty of an interviewee. The interviews were role-played ex-
changes between a professor and one of his students. The purpose
of the interview was to determine whether the student had altered
an examination before returning it to the professor for regrading.29
Researchers divided the subjects into three groups, with about fifty
subjects in each group. Each group evaluated four versions of the
interview, two with honest students and two with dishonest stu-
dents. One group watched the interviews, the second heard audi-
otape recordings, and the third read transcripts. The average
accuracy of both "listeners" and "readers" was about 77%. The
average accuracy of the "watchers" was 58%. Based on these re-
sults, Maier and Thurber concluded that "the visual cues of the in-
terview served primarily as distracters lowering the proportion of
accurate decisions. Interview situations in which an interviewee may
be motivated to deceive may be more accurately judged when the
interview is not directly observed."3 0
An obvious weakness in the Maier and Thurber experiment is
that the interviewees were role-playing-they pretended to lie or to
27 Applegate, supra note 25, at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
28 Norman R.F. Maier &James A. Thurber, Accuracy ofJudgments of Deception When an
Interview Is Watched, Heard, and Read, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 23 (1968).
29 Investigators had employed the same role-played scenario in two previous stud-
ies that addressed other aspects of deception detection. See Norman R.F. Maier &Junie
C. Janzen, Reliability of Reasons Used in Making Judgments of Honesty and Dishonesty, 25
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 141 (1967) (This study examined reasons given for judg-
ments as to honesty. Subjects performed better than chance, but the reasons they gave
for decisions did not seem to have validity or relation to correct judgments. Both good
and poor judges used the same kinds of reasons.); Norman R.F. Maier, Sensitivity to At-
tempts at Deception in an Interview Situation, 19 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 55 (1966) (finding
that interviewers were able to do better than chance in distinguishing between honest
and dishonest interviewees; the cues used in making the judgments were not apparent).
30 Maier & Thurber, supra note 28, at 23. In addition to reducing accuracy, the
opportunity to observe the interviewee produced a negative bias, i.e., it significantly in-
creased the frequency of judgments of dishonesty. Id. at 28-29.
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tell the truth.3' Subsequent experiments in which subjects at-
tempted to detect real lying by respondents with an incentive to
deceive do not suffer from the role-playing shortcoming.
A 1978 study by Littlepage and Pineault employed videotaped
segments of the television program "To Tell the Truth."3 2 In the
program, three contestants each claim to be a certain individual
whose major interest or accomplishment is described to a panel.
The panelists then question the contestants. Two of the contestants
are impostors who must deceive the panel to win money; the actual
described individual must be truthful. Subjects in the study viewed
episodes under four different conditions: (1) total information, in-
cluding facial, verbal content, and paralinguistic cues (voice); (2)
verbal content and paralinguistic only (audio with no video); (3) fa-
cial and verbal content (video with "dubbed" audio using another
voice); and (4) facial only (silent video). Subjects receiving only au-
dio were as accurate as subjects who received total information; sub-
jects under condition (3) were not significantly less accurate. Under
experimental condition (4), accuracy fell to the chance level.
Reconciling these results, Littlepage and Pineault concluded
that "facial information is not effectively used as an important cue to
the perception of truth."3 3 They noted that this finding was consist-
ent with other studies involving "attempted impression manage-
ment," including that of Maier and Thurber.3 4 Based upon the lack
of significant accuracy decline in the group receiving "dubbed"
voice, Littlepage and Pineault further concluded that "paralinguistic
cues are not effectively utilized in the detection of truth and lying
under conditions of attempted impression management,"35 another
result supported by Maier and Thurber's previous study.3 6 Since
another study had discerned paralinguistic differences between
truthful and deceptive messages,3 7 Littlepage and Pineault surmised
that "it is possible that although paralinguistic cues are available,
31 See Detecting Deceptive Communication, supra note 10, at 34 ("Whether respondents
'know' how real life liars behave is unknown; hence, it is unclear how the behavior of
role-playing liars relates to that of 'real world' liars.").
32 Littlepage & Pineault, supra note 10.
33 Id. at 463.
34 Id (citing Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Detecting Deception from the Body or
Face, 29 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 288 (1974) [hereinafter Ekman & Friesen,
Deception]); Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Cues to Deception, 32
PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969) [hereinafter Ekman & Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage]; Maier & Thur-
ber, supra note 28.
35 Littlepage & Pineault, supra note 10, at 463.
36 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (Maier and Thurber subjects receiving
transcript had same accuracy as subjects receiving audiotape).
37 See Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen & Klaus R. Scherer, Body Movement and Voice
Pitch in Deceptive Interaction, 16 SEMIOTICA 23 (1976).
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subjects are not proficient at decoding paralinguistic cues." 38
In another 1978 experiment reported by Miller and Fontes,3 9
researchers induced respondents to engage in real deception, which
subjects attempted to detect under four conditions: live, video, au-
dio, and transcript. Subjects were unable to do significantly better
than chance in any condition.40 There was no significant difference
in mean accuracy among live, video, and transcript conditions; sub-
jects who received audio performed significantly worse.41 Miller
and Fontes concluded that "[t]he identical accuracy scores in the
transcript and videotape conditions, and almost identical scores in
the live condition, suggest that the visual element of a presentation
may add little to an observer's ability to detect deception." 42 The
weak performance of audio compared to transcript in Miller and
Fontes's experiment reinforces Littlepage and Pineault's negative
finding concerning paralinguistic cues.43
A 1979 study by Hocking and others44 employed respondents
who told actual lies and truths with genuine incentives to succeed in
deception. Respondents were senior criminal justice students who
were told that ability to lie successfully is important in police work,
that the experiment would measure their aptitude in this regard,
and that the results would be reported to their school and might
affect such things as letters of recommendation. 45 In videotaped in-
terviews, respondents gave truthful and untruthful responses to two
types of questions, factual and emotional. Researchers presented
the interviews to 719 observers under fourteen separate sets of con-
ditions, including color or black-and-white video; head only, body
only, or head and body; with or without audio; and also audio only
and transcript only. The relative accuracy of observers in detecting
deception under the various conditions was compared and analyzed,
separating the factual and emotional interview segments.
The researchers reported that subjects who were asked what
behaviors they looked for to determine if someone was lying cited
mostly nonverbal cues:
Many mentioned eye behavior, saying people have less eye con-
tact when they are lying. Some said that liars were tense and
38 Littlepage & Pineault, supra note 10, at 463.
39 GERALD R. MILLER & NORMAN E. FoNTEs, THE EFFECTS OF VIDEOTAPED COURT
MATERIALS ON JUROR RESPONSE 11-42 (1978).
40 Id. at 38.
41 Id. at 41.
42 Id.
43 See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
44 Detecting Deceptive Communication, supra note 10.
45 Id. at 36. At the conclusion of the experiment, respondents were debriefed and
told that their performance would not, in fact, be evaluated and reported. Id. at 37.
1084 [Vol. 76:1075
nervous, slow to respond to questions, gestured unnaturally, swal-
lowed "too much," stuttered and exhibited other speaking non-
fluencies, were "too stiff," squinted, smiled unnaturally, had
"tight" faces, scratched their heads, and so on. Obviously, there
is no shortage of beliefs about behaviors associated with
deception.46
The results of the experiment do not support the notion that people
can detect deception based upon the behaviors cited by the subjects.
The results of the factual interview segments basically parallel the
results obtained by Maier and Thurber and Littlepage and Pineault.
That is, they indicate that nonverbal information was not useful to
the subjects in detecting deception, whereas verbal content did pro-
vide a basis for significantly better-than-chance judgments. Overall
accuracy for visual-only conditions was .467, below chance, and no
visual-only condition produced accuracy above .492. By contrast,
all conditions that included verbal content significantly surpassed
chance accuracy. Two of the three most accurate conditions were
transcript only (.625) and audio only (.613). Accuracy was highest
(.637) with total information (color, head, and body video with au-
dio), although not significantly higher than with transcript.4 7
The factual-emotional and head-body dichotomies of the Hock-
ing study were designed in part to address the thesis of Ekman and
Friesen's 1974 article, 48 that observers can more accurately discern
body cues than facial cues to deception. In the Ekman and Friesen
experiment, respondents received instructions to tell the truth
about their feelings when viewing pleasant pictures and to lie about
their feelings when viewing disturbing films of burn victims. Sub-
jects could not accurately detect deception from videos of the re-
spondents' faces, but subjects. did perform significantly better than
chance in judging truthfulness on the basis of body shots.
Hocking pointed out that the body cues which subjects read as
signs of deception may not, in fact, have been indicative of lying.
Instead, these cues may simply have reflected the stress experienced
by the respondents from watching the disturbing film. The Hocking
study used similar visual stimuli in the emotional segments, and rep-
licated Ekman and Freisen's body-face results. 49 The factual seg-
ments, however, which did not involve stressful stimuli, failed to
show any reliable body cues. In fact, judgments in the factual seg-
ments based on body-only shots without audio were consistently
46 Id. at 42.
47 Id. at 40.
48 See Ekman & Friesen, Deception, supra note 34; see also P. EKMAN, supra note 19, at
80-87, 98-122; Ekman & Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage, supra note 34.
49 Dectecting Deceptive Communication, supra note 10, at 41, 43.
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worse than chance. 50 This outcome strongly suggests that in both
the Hocking emotional-segment test and the Ekman-Friesen experi-
ment, subjects "read" body cues indicating stress from watching the
disturbing film, not cues indicating deception. 51
Although Littlepage and Pineault's 1979 study52 provided lim-
ited support for the Ekman-Freisen hypothesis that subjects detect
deception more accurately from the body than from the face, it rein-
forced their earlier negative findings regarding the value of facial
cues. 53 Subjects viewed honest and dishonest responses on video-
tapes showing either the face or the body of the respondent; all
tapes had full audio.54 Mean accuracy for facial shots was .526,
barely above chance; for body shots, mean accuracy was .758.55 For
truthful statements, facial and body shots produced similar accuracy
(.698 and .663, respectively). The difference occurred with respect
to untruthful statements, where facial shots yielded a dismal .353
accuracy as compared to .853 for body shots. 5 6 Subjects expressed
equally high confidence in their judgments based upon facial and
body shots. Littlepage and Pineault found it "of interest ... that
facial shots of dishonest statements would evoke low accuracy but
high confidence," a result that "seem[s] to indicate the success of
facial impression management. '57
The Littlepage and Pineault study deliberately avoided the
problem of stressful materials that Hocking had identified in the
Ekman and Friesen experiment. 58 As a result, the Littlepage and
Pineault experiment provides limited support for the existence of
usable body cues to deception. Unlike the Hocking study, however,
the Littlepage and Pineault study did not attempt to separate verbal
and nonverbal cues in various combinations. It compared only two
sets of channels or cues: verbal content plus voice plus body, versus
verbal content plus voice plus face. The first set yielded better re-
sults than the second.59 But it does not follow that the most accu-
rate set of channels includes the body, or that the body channel is
50 Id. at 40, 43.
51 Id. at 43.
52 Littlepage & Pineault, supra note 23.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
54 Statements were actually true or false, rather than role-played. Respondents
were apparently not given any special incentive to deceive successfully. See Littlepage &
Pineault, supra note 23, at 326.
55 Id. at 327.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 328.
58 Id. at 325.
59 The second, inferior set represents the conditions of most trial testimony, since
the witness's face is always exposed to the jury but often much of the witness's body is
not readily observable. See supra note 11.
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effectively employed in other combinations such as those that in-
clude the face. In Littlepage and Pineault's first experiment, for ex-
ample, subjects who received only audio performed as well as those
who received facial video with audio. 60 It would be consistent with
Littlepage and Pineault's second study if subjects receiving only au-
dio, or only transcript, performed as well as subjects receiving any
set that included the body. Hocking obtained just such results. 61
In 1981, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal extensively reex-
amined not only the literature, but also the underlying data of all
previous psychological studies of deception and deception detec-
tion, and conducted meta-analyses combining the original data of
the many experiments. 62 The previous studies consistently showed
that most people cannot do much better than chance in discerning
lies under laboratory conditions: "most of the results fall in the .45-
.60 range with a chance level of .5."63 With respect to the critical
question of which cues provide greater detection accuracy, com-
bined analysis of data from many studies indicated that "the face did
not seem to give away deception cues and may even have provided
misleading information."64 Detection accuracy in the absence of fa-
cial cues was higher than in their presence. Of all channels and
channel combinations, only the facial channel failed to produce ac-
curacy significantly greater than chance. 65
Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal found that in contrast to
the face, the availability of body cues increased deception detection
accuracy. 66 This conclusion, however, was based upon four studies
which included Ekman and Friesen's 1974 article and the .1979
Hocking study. Although the Hocking study in a sense "duplicated"
the Ekman and Friesen results, its overall effect is to cast serious
doubt upon the Ekman and Friesen body-cues thesis. 67
"The surprising finding," Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal
concluded, "is the power (i.e., the accuracy) of the word, either
60 See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
62 Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, supra note 12.
63 Id. at 26 (citations omitted). Subsequent studies have yielded similar results. See
Bond & Fahey, supra note 19, at 43 (49.51 percent accuracy, equivalent to random guess-
ing); Miller, deTurck & Kalbfleisch, supra note 13, at 113 (accuracy ranging from .45 to
.56); Ronald E. Riggio, Joan Tucker & Barbara Throckmorton, Social Skills and Deception
Ability, 13 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 568, 574 (1987) (accuracy did not
exceed chance level "very dramatic[ally]"); see also P. EIMAN, supra note 19, at 162 ("Our
research, and the research of most others, has found that few people do better than
chance in judging whether someone is lying or truthful. We also found that most people
think they are making accurate judgments even though they are not.").
64 Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 27.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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written or spoken. The assumption that nonverbal channels are
more important in the communication of deception than the verbal
cues is simply not true." 68 Whereas "facial cues seem to be faking
cues," which may hinder rather than assist in lie detection, "success
at deceiving and success at detecting deceit are both mediated
largely by adeptness at construing and interpreting verbal
nuances."
69
Taken as a whole, the experimental evidence indicates that or-
dinary observers do not benefit from the opportunity to observe
nonverbal behavior in judging whether someone is lying. There is
no evidence that facial behavior is of any benefit; some evidence
suggests that observation of facial behavior diminishes the accuracy
of lie detection. Nor do paralinguistic cues appear to be of value;
subjects who receive transcript consistently perform as well as or
better than subjects who receive recordings of the respondent's
voice. With respect to body cues, there is no persuasive evidence to
support the hypothesis that lying is accompanied by distinctive body
behavior that others can discern.
B. Demeanor and Detection of Witness Errors
The validity of testimony depends not only upon the sincerity
of the witness, but also upon the accuracy of the witness's beliefs.
Thus, in many cases the trier must appraise the perceptions and
memory of the witness, as well as his or her honesty. Conceivably,
the appearance and nonverbal behavior of witnesses may reveal un-
intended inaccuracy even if these cues are not effectively used to
detect deception. Unfortunately, the experimental evidence consist-
ently contradicts this hypothesis as well.
Indeed, the capacity of triers to appraise witness accuracy ap-
pears to be worse than their ability to discern dishonesty. As de-
scribed in subpart III(A), the deception detection studies indicate
that many subjects can do better than chance in detecting falsehood,
although they do so on the basis of verbal content analysis rather
than on the basis of nonverbal cues. The studies in which subjects
seek to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, on
68 Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 27 (citation omitted).
69 Id. at 39; see also A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
169 (1979). Yarmey noted:
In spite of the confidence that the average person has in his or her ability
to detect liars by their nonverbal behaviors, there is little justification in
the research literature to support such beliefs. If untrained observers,
such as the typical juror, make decisions about the truth of a witness's
statements solely on the basis of his stuttering or eye contact, etc., their




the other hand, reveal a complete inability to outdo chance, even
when using the verbal content of cross-examined testimony along
with demeanor.
The pertinent studies are part of the extensive literature
on eyewitness identifications. For our purposes, the pathbreaking
study is that of Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson, published in 1979.70
In that study, the researchers staged a theft 127 times before indi-
vidual eyewitnesses. Each witness attempted to identify the thief
from a photo lineup. In the presence of subject jurors, researchers
then examined and cross-examined twenty-four witnesses who had
made correct identifications and eighteen witnesses who had made
erroneous identifications. Subjectjurors showed no ability to distin-
guish between accurate and inaccurate identifications; they were as
likely to believe mistaken witnesses as accurate ones.71 The confi-
dence of the witness, rather than accuracy, was the major determi-
nant ofjuror belief.72 Unfortunately, confidence bears little relation
to the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. 73
Numerous studies have replicated the basic findings of the 1979
study-that subject jurors are unable to do better than chance in
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifi-
cations, and that the jurors accord inappropriate weight to witness
confidence.74 Criticism of earlier experiments from legal profes-
70 Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and
Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identfication, 64J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440 (1979).
71 Id at 444-45.
72 Id at 446.
73 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer
Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1980); Gary L. Wells &
Donna M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY 155 (Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth F. Loftus eds. 1984) (summarizing results of many studies).
74 See, e.g., R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Carolyn M. Rumpel, Can People Detect
Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 79
(1981); Gary L. Wells, How Adequate Is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in
EYEwrrNEss TESnMONY, supra note 73, at 256, 268-70; Gary L. Wells, TamaraJ. Fergu-
son & R.C.L. Lindsay, The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications for Triers of
Fact, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 688 (1981); Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do
Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memoy for Peripheral Detail
Can Be Misleading, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 682 (1981); Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay
& J.P. Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the
Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275 (1980); see also John C. Brigham
& Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors To Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 19 (1983); Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod &
Hedy Red Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 185 (1990); Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Thomas E. StuveJuror Decision
Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 41 (1988); Kenneth A.
Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share A Common Understanding Concerning
Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982); Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cut-
ler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 56-62
(Autumn 1989); David F. Ross, Beth S. Miller & Patricia B. Moran, The Child in the Eyes of
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sionals inspired the most interesting replication, published in
1989.75 In the earlier experiments, senior or graduate psychology
students interrogated witnesses using a predetermined script. Many
lawyers felt that interrogation of the witnesses by experienced attor-
neys might have enabled the jurors to make more accurate
judgments.
In the 1989 version, the researchers again staged crimes and
mock trials, but conducted the trials in a real courtroom some weeks
after the "crime." In addition, they obtained volunteer attorneys to
act as prosecutors and defense counsel. The attorneys were divided
into two groups, experienced criminal attorneys and senior law stu-
dents with some legal aid experience. Sixteen mock trials were con-
ducted and videotaped, eight involving an accurate witness and
eight involving an inaccurate witness. In each trial the witness un-
derwent direct, cross-, and redirect examination without time limit,
and the attorneys were permitted to make closing statements. The
taped trials were presented to separate juries, totaling 178 sub-
jects.76 The results were that "[e]yewitnesses who had identified the
guilty party led 68% of the mock jurors to vote guilty. Those who
identified an innocent suspect convinced 70% of mock jurors to
vote guilty." '77
The attorney experience factor had no effect on trial outcomes.
"Even experienced lawyers, free to question the witness as they
chose, were unable to lead mock jurors to believe accurate eyewit-
nesses more than inaccurate eyewitnesses. ' 78 Both experienced and
inexperienced prosecutors won 69% of the time, and both exper-
ienced and inexperienced defense lawyers lost 69% of the time. 79
This occurred despite the fact that the subject jurors were able to
distinguish the attorneys correctly as to experience and rated the
experienced lawyers as having done a better job.80 As in previous
studies, eyewitness confidence, rather than accuracy, was the identi-
fied predictor of juror belief.8 '
In the context of identification testimony, therefore, a good
body of experimental evidence consistently shows that jurors simply
cannot tell whether a witness's perception and memory are accurate.
theJury: Assessing Mock Jurors' Perceptions of the Child Witness, in STEPHEN J. CECI, MICHAEL
P. TOGLIA & DAVID F. Ross, CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 142 (1987).
75 See R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & FergusJ. O'Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accu-
rate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 333 (1989).
76 Id. at 336.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 338.
79 Id. at 336.
80 Id. at 336-37.
81 Id. at 337.
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In the experiments, the jurors had the benefit of verbal and nonver-
bal information, yet they never exceeded chance in making judg-
ments. In other words, neither verbal nor nonverbal cues are
effectively employed in these situations.
Conceivably, the problem of judging the accuracy of identifica-
tion testimony is somehow categorically different from the evalua-
tion of a witness's perception and memory in other contexts. Even
so, however, it is not plausible that such differences significantly af-
fect the utility of demeanor. If one supposes that witness demeanor
is generally useful to triers in judging the reliability of a witness's
perception and memory, one would hardly expect that identification
cases would be an exception to the rule. Identifications of strangers
challenge most people's faculties of perception and memory. If de-
meanor generally provided clues to the soundness of a person's per-
ceptions and memory, one would expect that demeanor information
would be relatively powerful in this context. Since demeanor infor-
mation proves useless in judging identifications, such information is




A. Live Testimony, Confrontation, and Hearsay
Strictly with regard to accuracy of credibility judgments, the
available evidence indicates that legal procedures could be im-
proved by abandoning live trial testimony in favor of presentation of
deposition transcripts. Transcripts are probably superior to live tes-
timony as a basis for credibility judgments because they eliminate
distracting, misleading, and unreliable nonverbal data and enhance
the most reliable data, verbal content.
To propose that live trial testimony be abandoned on the basis
of the foregoing premise would, however, be both unrealistic and
illogical. The confrontation clause mandates live testimony in crimi-
nal cases, at least as to testimony offered against the accused.82 The
Supreme Court has found the right of confrontation to be an essen-
tial ingredient of due process in many civil proceedings.8 3 Further-
more, live trial testimony would hardly be insecure if it had no place
in the Constitution. Purely as a political matter, American lawyers
82 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
83 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Willner v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
492, 496-97 (1959).
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and nonlawyers alike would not tolerate any major curtailment of an
institution so deeply embedded in our legal tradition.
That live testimony does not enhance credibility judgments
does not imply that a trial with live testimony is not the best kind of
trial. First, with regard to accuracy of factfinding -a broader issue
than accuracy of credibility determinations-live testimony may well
have overall positive value. The requirement of live testimony may
deter dishonest witnesses. Individuals who would lie in a deposition
may balk at lying in public, in a courtroom, in the physical presence
of the opponent, the judge, and thejury.8 4 Second, trials serve pur-
poses beyond the accurate determination of facts. It is probably
more important that the results of litigation be accepted than that
they be accurate. Accuracy is merely a factor, albeit a rather impor-
tant factor, in acceptability. Live testimony may be essential to per-
ceptions of fairness, regardless of the real relation between live
testimony and accuracy of outcomes.
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Coy v. Iowa85 explored
the value of live testimony. The defendant Coy was accused of sex-
ual assault upon two thirteen-year-old girls. At trial, a screen was
placed between the girls and the defendant during the girls' testi-
mony, as permitted by a 1985 Iowa statute. The screen blocked the
witnesses' view of the defendant and permitted him to see them
dimly. The jury had a full view of the witnesses. Reversing Coy's
convictions, the Supreme Court held that "the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with wit-
nesses appearing before the trier of fact." 86 The Court noted that
the constitutional guarantee of face-to-face encounter "serves ends
related both to appearances and to reality." T87 Citing Shakespeare
and Dwight Eisenhower, the Court found that for centuries face-to-
face encounter has been regarded as essential to a fair trial. 8 This
persistent perception is valid, according to the Court, because "[i]t
is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than
'behind his back.' "89
84 See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note ("The witness
himself will probably be impressed with the solemnity of the occasion and the possibility
of public disgrace. Willingness to falsify may reasonably become more difficult in the
presence of the person against whom directed."); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245.
85 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
86 Id. at 1016 (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 1017.
88 Id at 1016, 1017.
89 Id at 1019. In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), the Court upheld a
Maryland procedure whereunder a child victim-witness testified by closed-circuit televi-
sion from another room while the defendant remained in the courtroom. The Maryland
statute required that the trial judge find "'that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child
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Two dissenting Justices, relying heavily upon Wigmore,
disagreed with the majority's contention that face-to-face encounter
is an important aspect of confrontation. The overwhelming con-
cerns of confrontation, they argued, are cross-examination and
demeanor.90
Among the most notorious of the preconfrontation cases was
the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh on charges of treason.9 1 The
Supreme Court has cited Raleigh's case as an example of the abuses
that inspired the confrontation clause.92 When Raleigh demanded
that his accuser, Lord Cobham, be produced in person, Raleigh did
not contemplate either that he would cross-examine Cobham or that
Cobham's demeanor would display the falsity of the accusation.
Rather, Raleigh insisted that Cobham had recanted and would not
accuse him testimonially:
Lord Cecil. Let me ask you this, If my lord Cobham will say you
were the only instigator of him to proceed in the Treasons, dare
you put yourself on this?
Raleigh. If he will speak it before God and the king, that ever I
knew of Arabella's matter, or the Money out of Spain, or of the
surprising Treason; I put myself on it, God's will and the king's be
done with me.93
The majority in Coy did not cite Raleigh's case, but it supports the
Court's position and rebuts Wigmore's contention that confronta-
tion is only about cross-examination and demeanor.
The assumption that demeanor may be a reliable guide to cred-
cannot reasonably communicate.'" Id. at 3161 n.l (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc.
CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)). The Court held that the right of face-to-face con-
frontation is not absolute, and it may be subordinated to a case-specific finding of neces-
sity as prescribed in the Maryland provision. Id. at 3165-66.
90 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1029 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, supra note 2, §§ 1395, 1397, 1399 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
91 Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 T.B. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS i (1816).
92 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970). No adequate history of
the confrontation clause exists. See id. at 173-74 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Con-
frontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little
insight into [its] intended scope.... ."); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confronta-
tion and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BuLL. 99, 104,
118-19 (1972) (describing Wigmore's account of the historical background of the con-
frontation clause as "highly partisan and probably innaccurate," and criticizing Justice
White's historical assertions in California v. Green); Peter Westen, Confrontation and Com-
pulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 568
(1978). The connection between Raleigh's case and the clause has been called a "conve-
nient but highly romantic myth." Graham, supra, at 100 n.4; see also Kenneth W. Gra-
ham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and Rules of Evidence: Sir Walter Raleigh Rides Again, 9
ALAsKA LJ. 3, 22 (Jan. 1971). Whatever the specific historical relationship between Ra-
leigh's case and the confrontation clause, the case at least illustrates the holding in Coy
that confrontation may involve more than cross-examination and demeanor.
93 2 T.B. HowELL, supra note 91, at 23.
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ibility plays only a small role in the hearsay rule. The theory of the
hearsay rule is that to employ a person's belief in a matter as evi-
dence of the matter imposes certain dangers (the "hearsay dangers"
of errors in perception or memory, accidental miscommunication,
and insincerity), and that these dangers may be exposed or reduced
by the "ideal conditions" of testimony. Hence the rule normally ex-
cludes nontestimonial statements offered to prove the truth of mat-
ters stated.94 The "ideal conditions" most commonly cited are the
oath, personal presence, and cross-examination. In particular, the
value of presence is at least partly attributed to the supposed utility
of demeanor in determining credibility.95 Demeanor is accorded lit-
tle importance, however, compared to cross-examination, and its
supposed value is not a significant premise of the hearsay concept. 96
Recognition of the weakness of demeanor evidence does not
herald a revolution in trial procedure. Within the basic framework
of live trial testimony, a reappraisal of the proper role of demeanor
may nevertheless support a few nonrevolutionary recommenda-
tions. Traditional assumptions about witness demeanor arise in a
number of contexts besides discussions of the basic premises of live
testimony, confrontation, and the hearsay rule. Appellate courts in
nonjury cases often cite the opportunity of the trial judge to view
the demeanor of witnesses as a ground for deferring to the trial
court's factual determinations. The importance of demeanor is a
natural focus of rules governing the use of depositions and former
testimony in lieu of live trial testimony. Alternative dispute resolu-
tion techniques, such as summary jury trial, typically do not employ
live testimony, giving rise to concern about the absence of de-
meanor information. The value of demeanor has been central to
two doctrinal controversies concerning the extent of a civil jury's (or
judge's) discretion in evaluating the credibility of testimony: first,
whether the trier may reject the uncontradicted, unimpeached testi-
mony of a disinterested witness, and second, whether the trier may
find a fact on the basis of disbelief of testimony denying the fact.
B. Deference to Trial Court Findings on Credibility
Appellate courts have traditionally accorded generous defer-
ence to trial judges' factual findings, particularly where the findings
94 See, e.g., Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 61 TEx. L. REV. 49, 52-54 (1982).
95 See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 158; FED. R. EvID. art. VIII advisory committee's intro-
ductory note; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245.
96 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note; C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 5, § 245; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1365 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
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involve determinations of the credibility of oral testimony.97 Appel-
late judges have assumed that they, lacking the opportunity to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witnesses, simply could not make
credibility determinations as accurately as trial courts. If, as empiri-
cal research indicates, 98 a transcript is actually as good a basis for a
credibility determination as live testimony, appellate courts could
presumably make credibility determinations de novo with no sacri-
fice of accuracy. There are, however, adequate justifications for ap-
pellate deference to trial court findings of fact unrelated to
demeanor.
The history of the third sentence of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a) is instructive on this issue. The sentence now reads:
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibil-
ity of the witnesses." 99 The clause "whether based on oral or docu-
mentary evidence" was inserted by amendment in 1985 to
emphasize that the "clearly erroneous" standard applies to all find-
ings, not just to findings based upon oral testimony.
Prior to the 1985 amendment, many courts of appeals decisions
interpreted the rule to permit de novo review if the evidence below
was not oral.' 00 Professor Wright pointed out as early as 1957 that
these decisions simply misread the rule; the provision required ap-
plication of the "dearly erroneous" test to all findings.10 1 In addi-
tion to misconstruing the rule, the cases indulging in de novo review
represented bad judicial policy. To accord no finality to the trier's
findings undermines the resolution of disputes. As Professors
Wright and Miller explained: "Even in instances where an appellate
court is in as good a position to decide as the trial court, it should
97 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or docu-
mentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses."); F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 7, § 12.8, at 667 ("Whether the fact issues in
the trial court are determined by a jury or a judge, the appellate court limits itself to
inquiring whether there is a substantial evidentiary basis for the determinations."); 9
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2586, at 737 (1971) ("Though the appellate court can never set aside a finding of fact
unless it is clearly erroneous, it must be especially reluctant to set aside a finding based
on the trial judge's evaluation of conflicting oral testimony, and will do so only under
the most unusual circumstances.") (footnotes omitted).
98 See supra Part III.
99 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
100 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 97, § 2587. Many other courts of ap-
peals decisions, and all Supreme Court cases, correctly read the original provision to
apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to all findings. See id. § - 745-47 nn.33-35.
101 Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
751, 770 (1957).
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not disregard the trial court's finding, for to do so impairs confi-
dence in the trial courts and multiplies appeals with attendant ex-
pense and delay."' 10 2 As one court of appeals put it, the scope of
review should "encourage appeals that are based on a conviction
that the trial court's decision has been unjust; it should not... en-
courage appeals that are based on the hope that the appellate court
will second-guess the trial court."' 0 3
An appellate court may always be "in as good a position to de-
cide as the trial court," in the sense that the traditionally disparaged
"cold record" may be as good a basis for decision, including judg-
ments of credibility, as the trial court's traditionally exalted oppor-
tunity to see the witnesses. De novo review of facts is nevertheless a
bad idea, and appellate court rejection of trial court findings should
continue to be limited to instances of clear error.
On the other hand, in applying the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard, the trial judge's access to demeanor evidence should not by
itself justify deference. If the trial judge's factual conclusions are
clearly wrong based upon the content of testimony and other evi-
dence of record, the appellate court should set aside the findings.
Findings that appear clearly incorrect on the basis of the record
should not be sustained on the theory that they might be premised
upon a witness's demeanor.
C. Use of Depositions and Former Testimony
Testimony taken in a deposition or in another proceeding is
normally admissible in lieu of the witness's live testimony only if two
conditions are satisfied: the witness is unavailable to testify in per-
son and the party against whom the evidence is offered had an op-
portunity and similar motive to examine the witness at the
deposition or previous proceeding.' 0 4 The unavailability require-
ment reflects the importance ascribed to demeanor. The Advisory
Committee's note to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) expresses
the traditional view:
Former testimony does not rely upon some set of circumstances
to substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and
opportunity to cross-examine were present in fact. The only miss-
102 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 97, § 2587, at 748.
103 Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 114 (9th Cir. 1962).
104 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony or deposition admissible if witness
unavailable (as defined in rule 804(a)) and "the party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination");
UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (identical); FED. R. Crv. P. 32(a) (use of deposition at trial;
unavailability generally required); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e) (same); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 5, ch. 25.
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ing one of the ideal conditions for the giving of testimony is the
presence of trier and opponent ("demeanor evidence"). This is
lacking with all hearsay exceptions. Hence it may be argued that
former testimony is the strongest hearsay and should be included
under Rule 803, supra [i.e., unavailability should not be required].
However, opportunity to observe demeanor is what in a large
measure confers depth and meaning upon oath and cross-exami-
nation. Thus in cases under Rule 803 demeanor lacks the signifi-
cance which it possesses with respect to testimony. In any event,
the tradition, founded in experience, uniformly favors production
of the witness if he is available.' 0 5
In criminal cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that to
introduce former testimony against an accused violates the confron-
tation clause unless the prosecution has satisfactorily demonstrated
that the witness is unavailable to testify at the trial.10 6
Critics such as Dean McCormick have objected to the unavaila-
bility requirement for former testimony, pointing out that no such
requirement is imposed upon other, less commendable hearsay
exceptions:
Few, if any, other hearsay exceptions measure up in reliability to
former testimony. Yet former testimony is one of a very small
group upon which the requirement of unavailability is imposed.
The incongruity of according this second-class status to former
testimony is apparent when it is compared with such exceptions as
declarations of present bodily or mental state, or excited or spon-
taneous utterances, where no showing of unavailability is
required. 0 7
The incongruity described by McCormick is not without any ra-
tionale, however. The Supreme Court, which constitutionalized the
unavailability requirement for former testimony offered against an
accused, declined to extend the requirement to coconspirator state-
ments. The Court explained the distinction as follows:
[F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testi-
mony .... If the declarant is available and the same information
can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony,
with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the de-
meanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on
the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable
105 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
106 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 252.
107 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 261; see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 238, at 500 (lst ed. 1954) [hereinafter C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE].
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as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence....
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator state-
ments. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in progress,
such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that
cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same
matters in court. 108
In other words, former testimony is normally inferior to present tes-
timony. Most other hearsay exceptions admit statements that, ow-
ing to their circumstances, offer something beyond what the
declarant's trial testimony could provide. Therefore, it may be logi-
cal to exclude an available witness's former testimony and simulta-
neously admit statements of the same declarant under other hearsay
exceptions.
The logic of the unavailability requirement depends upon the
extent to which former testimony is actually inferior to live testi-
mony. The assumption that former testimony is inferior, however,
relies substantially on the faulty premise that demeanor evidence is
valuable in determining a witness's credibility. If former testimony
satisfies the requirements of opportunity and similar motive to de-
velop the testimony, then it is probably as good as live testimony for
purposes of the trier's evaluation of credibility. Live testimony and
confrontation at trial serve ends unrelated to demeanor, 109 but an
unavailability requirement is unnecessary to protect those values.
A party desiring to confront at trial an available witness whose for-
mer testimony is introduced may call the witness, so long as the
party had sufficient notice that the former testimony would be
presented.110
In criminal cases, longstanding confrontation clause doctrine
requires witness unavailability for admission of former testimony of-
fered against the accused."' In civil cases and in criminal cases with
respect to defense evidence, however, abolition of the unavailability
requirement is both constitutionally permissible and desirable in
light of the psychological research on demeanor.
This idea is hardly radical. The 1942 Model Code of Evidence
proposed that former testimony be admissible "unless the judge
finds that the declarant is available as a witness and in his discretion
rejects the evidence." 112 Dean McCormick favored this treatment
108 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986).
109 See supra subpart IV(A).
110 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 261 (citing English Civil Evidence Act of
1968, c. 64, Part I, §§ 2(1), 8, permitting trial use of former testimony subject to a notice
requirement).
I11 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
112 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 511 (1942).
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for civil cases." 3 The 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, a much
more conservative codification than the Model Code, retained the
unavailability requirement for former testimony except depositions
taken "for use as testimony in the trial of the action in which of-
fered."'1 4 This rule resembles the longstanding Texas civil rule
permitting use at trial of depositions taken for the same action with-
out regard to availability. 15 Professors Wright and Miller, judging
that the Texas rule "has not led to excessive use of depositions
rather than live witnesses," suggest that the merits of the federal
unavailability requirement are "debatable."' 16
In light of the extensive research impugning the value of de-
meanor, unavailability should be abolished as a precondition for ad-
missibility in civil cases not only of depositions taken in the same
action, but of all former testimony that otherwise meets the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques
In most alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, such
as summary jury trial, live testimony of witnesses is not presented.
Instead, the attorneys summarize anticipated testimony. 117 Both
proponents and critics of these ADR techniques have regarded the
absence of witness demeanor as a serious deficiency in cases
presenting credibility issues. 1 8 Social science evidence indicates
113 C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 238; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 5, § 261.
114 UNIF. R. EvID. 63(3) (1953).
115 See TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. 207 (Vernon Supp. 1990). In other circumstances,
Texas imposes the traditional unavailability requirement upon former testimony and
depositions. See TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. arts. 39.01, 39.12 (Vernon 1979); TEX. R.
Civ. EID. 804(b)(1); TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 804(b)(1); STEVEN GOODE, OLIN WELLBORN &
MICHAEL SHARLOT, GUIDE TO THE TExAs RuLEs OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§§ 801.14, 804.3 (1988).
116 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 97, § 2142. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 32(a) generally requires unavailability for use of a deposition at trial, other than for
impeachment or as a party admission. A deposition may be used under the rule without
a showing of unavailability "upon application and notice, [if the court finds] that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest ofjustice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used." FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E). The reference to
the importance of live testimony was intended as a warning against permitting general
use of depositions upon the parties' consent. Free use of depositions by consent was
provided in the Advisory Committee's Preliminary Draft of Rule 32 and had been the
practice of some courts under the Equity Rules of 1912. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co.,
201 F.2d 484, 487-88 n.4 (2d Cir. 1952); 4A J. MOORE, supra note 5, 32.05; 5 id.
43.03.
117 See Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 471 (1984); Edward Sherman, Reshaping the Lawyer's Skills for
Court-SupervisedADR, 51 TEX. BJ. 47, 48 (1988).
118 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
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that the absence of demeanor evidence alone probably does not
weaken these processes.
A more serious issue is the effect of summarization, because the
same social science evidence indicates that close examination of ver-
bal content is useful to the one evaluating credibility. In a summary
jury format, for example, presentation of actual depositions might
provide a basis for credibility determinations equivalent to live testi-
mony in potential accuracy. Of course, to present complete deposi-
tions rather than summaries would seriously undermine the
efficiency of the procedure. Not all testimony presents significant
credibility determinations, however. It may be feasible to introduce
verbatim deposition transcripts of only those portions of testimony
presenting important credibility problems, without seriously under-
mining the efficiency of ADR presentations. If so, the absence of
live testimony and demeanor should not be a serious concern.
E. Uncontradicted, Unimpeached Testimony of a Disinterested
Witness
Two related doctrinal controversies concern credibility of testi-
mony: first, whether the trier may reject the uncontradicted,
unimpeached testimony of a disinterested witness, and second,
whether the trier may find a fact on the basis of disbelief of testi-
mony denying the fact. The prevalent law on these issues reflects a
degree of judicial skepticism concerning the power of demeanor to
reveal truth and falsehood to jurors. All courts have refused to
permit findings based solely on disbelief of testimony to the con-
trary.11 9 A few courts have permitted juries to disbelieve uncontra-
dicted, unimpeached, disinterested testimony, but the great
majority do not. 120 As Professors James and Hazard noted, the ma-
jority rule "amounts to a holding that reasonable people could not
disbelieve such testimony on the basis of demeanor evidence."' 12 1
Most commentators have approved this limitation on the jury's use
of "demeanor evidence."' 122
The majority position disallowing demeanor-based rejection of
L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1987); Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 374
(1986); Sherman, supra note 117, at 48-49.
119 See infra subpart IV(F).
120 See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD supra note 7, § 7.11; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 97, § 2527; Cooper, supra note 1, at 930; Annotation, Credibility of Witness Giving
Uncontradicted Testimony as Matter for Court or Jury, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191 (1958).
121 F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 7, § 7.11.
122 See id.; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 97, § 2527; Cooper, supra note 1, at
930-40. Dean Wigmore's position is unclear, however. Compare 7 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, supra note 2, § 2034 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978) (jury need not believe uncon-
tradicted testimony) with 9 id. § 2495 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981) (quoting with
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uncontradicted, disinterested testimony is supported by the empiri-
cal evidence that demeanor is not a reliable guide to credibility. On
the other hand, although experimental subjects have not made ef-
fective use of nonverbal indicia to ascertain the truthfulness of testi-
mony, they have demonstrated the ability to render significantly
better-than-chance judgments using verbal content. 123 This sug-
gests the following treatment: If demeanor is the only possible basis
for rejection of a disinterested witness's testimony, the testimony
must be accepted; if, however, the content of the testimony provides
a reasonable basis to reject it, the jury may do so. Something like
the foregoing distinction likely obtains in practice by interpretation
and application of the requirements that the testimony be uncontra-
dicted and unimpeached. As one federal court put it, "Exaggera-
tion, inherent improbability, self-contradiction, omissions in a
purportedly complete account, imprecision and errors may all breed
disbelief and therefore the disregard of even uncontradicted non-
opinion testimony."' 24
Interested witness testimony presents a wholly different prob-
lem. Demeanor is no more reliable a basis for rejecting interested
testimony than disinterested testimony, yet "[n]o one would cham-
pion a rule which requires belief of anything an interested witness
might say." 125 The circumstance of interest, by itself, greatly in-
creases the probability of false testimony, both conscious and un-
conscious. Any rule of forced acceptance of interested testimony
would increase erroneous outcomes. 26
F. Disbelief of Testimony as a Basis for Finding a Fact
Assume that plaintiff must prove X. No witness testifies X, nor
does sufficient circumstantial evidence appear from which to infer X.
A witness who knows about X testifies "not X." May the jury, on the
basis of disbelief of the witness's testimony, find X? Hundreds of
cases say no.' 27 "Mere disbelief of testimony is not proof of facts of
approval language stating that in appropriate circumstances judge may compel jury to
accept uncontradicted testimony).
123 See supra subpart III(A).
124 Sternberger v. United States, 401 F.2d 1012, 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
125 Cooper, supra note 1, at 941.
126 See id
127 A good sample of cases may be found in West's American Digest System, mainly
under Evidence Key Number 588. The earliest cases cited in the American Digest that
invoke the disbelief-is-not-evidence doctrine are Miller v. Smith, 20 A.D. 507, 510-11,
47 N.Y.S. 49, 51 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (overturning trialjudge's finding of fraud and collusion
based upon disbelief of testimony); Wallace v. Berdell, 97 N.Y. 13, 21 (1884); Mercer v.
Wright, 3 Wis. 568, 570 (1854) (reversible error to instruct jury in trespass case that
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an opposite nature or tendency."1 28
Like the majority rule requiring acceptance of uncontradicted,
unimpeached, disinterested testimony, the doctrine that disbelief of
testimony may not alone support a finding results from courts' lim-
ited faith in the revelatory power of demeanor. As the Supreme
Court of Utah noted:
While the demeanor of the witness in testifying is very important
and should be given consideration by the trier of fact, still there
must be something more than the batting of an eye, the coloring
they could use disbelief of defendant's witnesses as evidence of defendant's guilt, absent
evidence that defendant had suborned the false testimony).
The Digests collect a particularly large number of Massachusetts cases citing the
doctrine during the period from 1911 through 1933. E.g., De Blois v. Boylston &
Tremont Corp., 281 Mass. 498, 183 N.E. 823 (1933); Rubenstein v. Economy Grocery
Stores Corp., 274 Mass. 608, 174 N.E. 922 (1931); Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., 270
Mass. 340, 170 N.E. 77 (1930); Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501,
167 N.E. 235 (1929); McDonough v. Vozzela, 247 Mass. 552, 142 N.E. 831 (1924);
Martell v. Dorey, 235 Mass. 35, 126 N.E. 354, cert. dismissed sub nom. Bryne v. Martell, 254
U.S. 665 (1920); Phillips v. Gookin, 231 Mass. 250, 120 N.E. 691 (1918); Cruzan v. New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 227 Mass. 594, 116 N.E. 879 (1917), dismissed, 249
U.S. 621 (1919); Town of Wakefield v. American Sur. Co., 209 Mass. 173, 95 N.E. 350
(1911); Hyslop v. Boston & Maine R.R., 208 Mass. 362, 94 N.E. 310 (1911).
It is possible that the cluster of Massachusetts cases is merely a vagary of the Digest
collection system; otherwise, cases citing the doctrine appear to be ubiquitous, and
many are federal. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 512, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 340
U.S. 573, 576 (1951); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1985); Coll-
man v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial judge's disbelief of
taxpayer's testimony cannot suffice to establish taxpayer's knowledge of a fact); Kenneth
E. Curran, Inc. v. Salvucci, 426 F.2d 920, 923 (1st Cir. 1970); Federal Ins. Co. v. Sum-
mers, 403 F.2d 971,974 (1st Cir. 1968); NLRB v.Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883
(1st Cir. 1966);Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Mandelbaum v. United States, 251 F.2d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1958); Dyer v. Mac-
Dougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.); Mosson v. Liberty Fast
Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand, J.); Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d
962, 964 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); Group Hospitalization, Inc. v. District of Columbia
Comm'n on Human Rights, 380 A.2d 170, 174 (D.C. 1977); Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So.
2d 70, 74 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 115 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1959); New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v.
Redmann, 28 So. 2d 303, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1946); Michigan Employment Relations
Comm'n v. Cafana Cleaners, Inc., 73 Mich. App. 752, 761, 252 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1977);
Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568, 569, 227 N.W. 896, 897 (1929); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Page, 105 N.H. 410, 200 A.2d 851, 853 (1964); Clairmont v. Cilley, 85 N.H. 1, 7, 153 A.
465, 468 (1931); Briscoe v. Laminack Tire Serv., 546 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.
6th Dist. 1977); Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 32-33, 47 P.2d 1054, 1062
(1935); see also RICHARD FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE
510-14 (5th ed. 1984); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 7, § 7.11; 2J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, supra note 2, § 278 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979); 9 C. WRIGHTr & A. MILLER,
supra note 97, § 2528; Cooper, supra note 1, at 937-39;John MacArthur Maguire & Rob-
ert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE LJ. 226, 252-
57 (1935); Edmund Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 185-86 (1937).
128 McDonough, 247 Mass. at 558, 142 N.E. at 833.
of the cheek, or the twiddling of the thumbs as a basis for finding
facts.129
Not surprisingly, a few enthusiasts of "demeanor evidence" have
disapproved of the doctrine, notably Judge Jerome Frank. i1 0
Insofar as the disbelief-is-not-evidence rule forbids the use of
demeanor alone as a basis for a finding, it also finds support in the
experimental evidence. But what if the trier rationally bases disbe-
lief and contrary inference not upon the witness's demeanor, but
upon the content of the testimony? The case law and commentary
on the disbelief problem have generally addressed it as a question of
the permissible reach of "demeanor evidence," without drawing the
distinction between disbelief based upon demeanor and disbelief
based upon content.131 One early article suggested that the general
prohibition against what the authors called "probative backspin"
might be waived "where disbelief is reasonably induced by factors
perceptible to the trial and appellate courts as well as to the jury,"
that is, where the grounds of the disbelief and contrary inference are
in the record.'3 2 A rare case authorizing a finding based upon dis-
belief of testimony relied solely upon close analysis of testimonial
content and record evidence that other parts of the testimony were
false, with no mention of demeanor. 133
If a witness gives testimony that may reasonably be judged a
fabrication without resort to demeanor, and if under the circum-
stances the fact that the witness has lied in turn reasonably supports
some contrary proposition of fact, the inference should be permit-
ted. Such cases will be rare. Disbelief of an assertion does not ordi-
narily imply belief in an opposite assertion,134 but in some instances
129 Chapman, 87 Utah at 32, 47 P.2d at 1062.
130 See Dyer, 201 F.2d at 269-72 (Frank, J., concurring). Judge Learned Hand, writ-
ing for the court in the same case, agreed with Judge Frank that demeanor alone might
rationally justify a finding opposite the testimony. Nevertheless, the court held that the
orthodox doctrine should be followed on the ground that there could be no effective
appellate review of a trial judge's decision to permit an issue to go to the jury on the
basis of witness demeanor. Id. at 269; see also Richard Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibil-
ity and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 735 n.134 (1987); Morgan, supra note 127, at 185-86.
131 See, e.g., Dyer, 201 F.2d at 269; id at 269-72 (Frank, J., concurring); Cooper, supra
note 1, at 937-39.
132 Maguire & Vincent, supra note 127, at 257.
133 See Eckart v. Kiel, 123 Minn. 114, 118-19, 143 N.W. 122, 124 (1913). But see
Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568, 569, 227 N.W. 896, 897 (1929), where the court
noted that "the stories of the defendants were such that a jury might think them un-
true," but nevertheless held that "[t]he court could not find a fact necessary to be
proved.., as to which there was no affirmative testimony, by a claim that the negative
testimony was unworthy of belief. This is the holding of the cases throughout."
134 See Mosson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1942) ("those
are not the only possibilities").
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the implication is reasonable.' 3 5 The extent of permissible infer-
ences drawn from the presentation of particular false testimony is
analogous to the weight given to a party's extrajudicial fabrication,
suppression, spoliation, or subornation of evidence. In appropriate
circumstances, inferences from such "admissions by conduct" are
permitted to support particular findings.' 3 6 The presentation of
false testimony at trial should be treated similarly, where the judg-
ment of falsity reasonably derives not from demeanor, but from the
testimonial content or other record evidence. To this extent, the
doctrine that disbelief of testimony can never alone support a find-
ing of fact should be qualified.
V
CONCLUSION
The notion that viewing the appearance and demeanor of a wit-
ness significantly assists a trier of fact to determine the truthfulness
of the witness's testimony appears to be as ancient as testimony it-
self. The supposed ability of jurors and judges to discern sincerity
or deception from nonverbal manifestations has had an important
role in legal discourse and doctrine. The extent to which expe-
rienced practicing attorneys and judges maintain a genuine faith in
the reliability of demeanor is less certain, although published ex-
pressions of skepticism on the matter have been strikingly rare.
If ordinary people in fact possess the capacity to detect false-
hood or error on the part of others by observing their nonverbal
behavior, then it should be possible, indeed easy, to demonstrate
such a capacity under controlled conditions. Over the past twenty-
five years, a large number of experiments involving thousands of
subjects have searched for this capacity. With remarkable consis-
tency, the experiments have shown that it simply does not exist. To
the extent that people can detect lying or erroneous beliefs in an-
other, they do so primarily by paying close attention to the content
'35 Cf NLRB v.Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1966). There, the
First Circuit asserted:
The mere disbelief of testimony of itself establishes nothing. Affirmative
proof, however, that the reason given [for the discharge] was false war-
rants the inference that some other reason was being concealed. If the
employer is independently shown to have an antiunion animus which the
discharge would gratify, it may be a fair inference that this was the true
reason.
Id. (citations omitted).
136 See United States v. Philatelic Leasing, 601 F. Supp. 1554, 1565-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1986); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 273; 2J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 278, 291 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979); Maguire &
Vincent, supra note 127; Morgan, supra note 127, at 183-86.
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of what the other says, not by observing facial expression, posture,
tone of voice, or other nonverbal behavior.
Although the law may have been wrong about the value of wit-
ness demeanor, devaluation of demeanor's utility does not imply
dramatic legal changes. Central procedural institutions such as the
general requirement of live testimony, the hearsay rule, and the
right of confrontation have ample foundations apart from assump-
tions regarding the value of demeanor. These institutions are not
threatened by recognition that the assumptions may be mistaken.
Similarly, to conclude that a transcript may be as good a basis for
credibility determinations as seeing and hearing the witnesses does
not justify de novo appellate review of facts. Adequate grounds, un-
related to demeanor, exist to restrict appellate review of trial court
factual findings. Review under the established "clearly erroneous"
standard might nevertheless in some instances be affected by a rec-
ognition that viewing testimony in transcript rather than in person
does not provide inferior information.
The recognition that witness demeanor fails to provide critical
information certainly justifies liberalization of the rules of admissi-
bility of depositions and former testimony in civil cases. In the
growing use of ADR techniques that do not employ live testimony,
such as summary jury trial, the research findings on credibility indi-
cate that concerns over the accuracy of these techniques because of
the absence of demeanor evidence is misplaced. Instead, concern
should shift to the lack of verbatim text in instances where genuine
credibility issues arise.
Finally, the social science evidence reinforces, to a large extent,
two established legal doctrines: that a trier must accept the uncon-
tradicted, unimpeached testimony of a disinterested witness, and
that disbelief of testimony cannot by itself support a finding of a
contrary fact. In both instances, however, a distinction should be
drawn between disbelief based upon demeanor and disbelief based
upon verbal content. It is appropriate to apply either doctrine to
disbelief based upon demeanor, but reasonable disbelief based
upon content should be permitted the same weight as any other rea-
sonable inference by the trier.
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